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Judges and
Religious-Based
Reasoning
Diana Ginn* and David Blaikie**
Is it ever acceptable for a judge in a secular
liberal democracy1 to rely on, and explicitly
refer to, religious-based reasoning2 in reaching a decision? While it is unlikely that many
Canadian judges will be seized with the desire to include religious-based reasoning in
their judgments, we raise this issue because
it allows us to examine the appropriate role
of religious-based discourse in a challenging
context, where arguments about unconstitutionality are strongest. In a previous article,
we concluded that there are no ethical impediments to citizens using such discourse in discussing public affairs. We argued that it is no
less virtuous (although it may sometimes be
less persuasive) to reason from one’s religious
convictions than from any other comprehensive set of values, when advocating for or
against public policy alternatives.3 We would
suggest that this is generally also the case for
elected representatives. Thus, in our view, it
would be perfectly acceptable for a member
of a legislature to buttress a call for increased
funding for social services by reference to
Proverbs 19:17: “One who is gracious to a poor
man lends to the Lord.” 4 However, it is unconstitutional for a legislature to pass legislation
for a religious purpose5; therefore, legislators
must recognize the distinction between advocating legislation designed to achieve a religious purpose and using religious arguments
to support or oppose legislation designed to
achieve a public purpose.6
The question we address here is whether it
would be acceptable for a Canadian judge to
use religious-based reasoning and, if so, what
parameters might need to be placed on the use
of such reasoning. We conclude that the use of
religious-based reasoning would be acceptable,
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but only where the law is underdetermined; that
is, where the relevant constitutional principles,
legislation and case law do not resolve the issue,
and where substantial interpretation and development of the law is required in order to decide
the matter before the judge. We would add the
further important proviso that the reasoning
must conform to the constitutional requirement that the state remain neutral as among
different religions and as between religion and
non-religion.
We begin our discussion by outlining what
we mean by legal underdeterminacy, and then
respond to various arguments against allowing
religious-based reasoning by judges, with a particular focus on arguments relating to unfairness and unconstitutionality.

When is the law underdetermined?
We start from the premise that where the law is
clear, there is no room (or reason) for a judge to
turn to his comprehensive set of beliefs—religious or not—to reach a conclusion. For example, consider a situation where a statute states
that it is an offence to drive faster than 110 km/
hour. If the evidence makes it clear that the accused did so, and there are no valid defences put
forward, the judge must find the accused guilty;
the law is settled and reaching the appropriate
verdict requires no reference to extra-judicial
fundamental beliefs. Consider another example.
A First Nation in Canada makes a land claim
based on Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court of
Canada has set out a test, based on historic use
and occupation of the land, for determining the
existence of Aboriginal title. While it may be
difficult to decide whether the test has been met
in a particular situation, the test itself is clearly
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stated in the law. Therefore, it is the test that any
lower court must work with, and a judge cannot turn to her religion—or to any other comprehensive set of values—to craft a new test for
determining the existence of Aboriginal title.
Nor may judges use their religious—or other—
beliefs to undermine the legal system they are
part of. For instance, a judge could not refuse to
follow the rule of law because it did not conform
with her religious beliefs. If the fundamental
principles of the legal system are incompatible
with a judge’s core beliefs, then she should step
down.
Even within an established system of law,
however, there will be times when the law is
underdetermined. As an example, consider a
1999 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v Dobson,7
where the Court was called on to develop new
legal principles in order to resolve a difficult and
significant issue. In Dobson, the Supreme Court
of Canada addressed the question of whether
a child could sue his mother for harms caused
by the mother’s negligence during pregnancy.
Although previous case law dealt with related
issues, there was no Canadian jurisprudence directly on point.
Mrs. Dobson, five months pregnant, was
driving her car on a snowy winter day. Her car
skidded; there was an accident and her son,
Ryan, was born prematurely. Ryan has cerebral
palsy; he is profoundly disabled and requires
lifetime care. Ryan sued his mother, alleging
negligence. If Mrs. Dobson had been found
negligent, then her insurers would have had
to make a substantial payment to Ryan. First,
however, the Supreme Court of Canada had to
decide whether Mrs. Dobson was liable in law.
Could Ryan sue his mother on the grounds that
her negligence during pregnancy caused him
harm?
The Supreme Court of Canada was in uncharted legal waters. This was the first time that
the Court had been called upon to answer this
question and neither the Constitution, relevant
legislation, nor case law provided a clear-cut
answer. The Court had to decide which of the
competing public policy alternatives should
prevail, and choosing among those alternatives
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required making value judgments about how
the law could best serve the interests of society,
as well as its individual members such as Ryan
and his mother.
The majority of the Court refused to extend
established principles of tort law in order to allow Ryan to sue his mother. Their decision was
based on public policy concerns regarding the
privacy and autonomy rights of women, and on
the difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women.
The two dissenting judges held that concerns
about autonomy could not justify placing the
rights of a pregnant woman above that of her
child. They went on to say: “To grant a pregnant
woman immunity from the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her acts for her born alive
child would create a legal distortion as no other
plaintiff carries such a one-sided burden, nor
any defendant such an advantage.”8
In Dobson, neither the majority nor the dissenting judgment referred to religious beliefs
or values at all—but what if they had? What if
the judge writing for the majority had related
the public policy argument about autonomy
to a religious belief that God has created all of
us, male and female, as equal and autonomous
beings, equally deserving of respect and dignity? What if the dissenting judges had based
their decision on a belief in God’s concern for
the vulnerable and the powerless? The outcome
of the case would have been the same, but the
analysis would have been explicitly grounded in
religious belief and reasoning. Would express
reliance on religious-based reasoning be acceptable in a case such as this?

The arguments against religiousbased judicial reasoning
The key arguments against the explicit use of religious-based reasoning by judges involve concerns about inherent dangers in religious-based
reasoning; inconsistency with the role of the
judge in a democracy; unfairness to litigants;
and threats to freedom of religion. We address
each of these, with a particular emphasis on
fairness and freedom of religion.
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Inherent dangers in religious-based reasoning
The argument that religious-based reasoning
is inherently more dangerous than other kinds
of value-based reasoning seems to encompass
three strands: that religious belief requires a
leap of faith and thus any reasoning based on
religion is inherently more risky than reasoning based on a secular, rational approach; that
religious-based reasoning is inherently more
divisive than other kinds of argumentation;
and that religious-based reasoning is inherently
more likely to lead to bad results.9
With regard to the first strand, we acknowledge that religious belief involves a leap of faith.
By “leap of faith” we mean accepting as true
something that is not empirically provable.
Rejecting religious-based reasoning on this
ground raises the larger epistemological question of whether there are justifiable grounds for
saying that certain ways of knowing are superior to others.10 There is also the more pragmatic
point that the leap of faith argument simply does
not work as a means to distinguish religious
reasoning from secular reasoning. We take it as
given that most people’s conclusions about what
is right or wrong, what is just, or what course of
action is the better one, are grounded in some
sort of comprehensive set of values—that is, by
fundamental assumptions about the nature of
reality, whether religious or secular.11 We argue that leaps of faith are required for any such
fundamental assumptions and, therefore, this is
no different for religion than for other comprehensive belief systems. For instance, it is a core
premise of liberalism that all people are entitled
to equal rights—presumably because at some
fundamental level, all human beings have equal
intrinsic value, unrelated to their social status,
wealth, character, accomplishments, contributions to society or physical or mental attainments. There is no way of empirically proving this inherent equal value: a leap of faith is
required.
Further, while we accept that religious belief
is grounded on a leap of faith, when we speak
of judges using religious-based reasoning, our
emphasis is as much on “reasoning” as on “religious.” Whatever fundamental principles form
the bedrock of a judge’s worldview, judges must
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel

reason and analyze—and this is never more so
than when the law is underdetermined and it
is necessary to turn to extra-judicial values in
order to choose between different approaches
to the issue in dispute. Even if it is acceptable
for judges to make explicit reference to religion
when faced with a situation of underdeterminacy, there is still the expectation that reasoning is involved. Thus, we distinguish between a
judge moving directly from her understanding
of divine will to the outcome (as in “God told
me to decide for the plaintiff”)12 and a judge,
faced with underdeterminacy, using principles
derived from his religious beliefs as a starting
place for the analysis.13 A well-known example of the latter kind of reasoning is found in
the landmark case of Donoghue v Stevenson,14
where the House of Lords was called on to set
the parameters of liability in the newly-emerging
field of negligence. The existing law did not provide a clear answer, so Lord Atkin turned to the
Golden Rule, stating:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour
becomes in law you must not injure your
neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who
is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply.
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely
and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation
as being so affected when I am directing my
mind to the acts or omissions which are called
in question.15

A second danger sometimes attributed to religiousbased reasoning is that it is inherently disruptive.
Thus, Richard Rorty claims, “[W]e shall not be
able to keep a democratic community going
unless the religious believers remain willing to
trade privatization for a guarantee of religious
liberty.”16 We addressed this argument in our
previous article,17 and so we need only canvas
it briefly here. In short, our response is that religious beliefs are no more divisive than many
other strongly held convictions. To understand
the absurdity of Rorty’s claim we need only
substitute another comprehensive, but secular,
world view: “We shall not be able to keep a dem-
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ocratic community going unless libertarians are
willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of
freedom of conscience.”
The final strand of the argument that religiousbased reasoning is inherently dangerous focuses
less on the reasoning process, or on the reactions
of others to that reasoning, and more on the
outcomes that are assumed to follow from such
reasoning. This fear seems to proceed from the
assumption that all individuals of faith hold
similar views on social issues—an assumption
that is clearly untenable in light of the great
diversity of religious beliefs—and that these
views are harmful to society. We reject the position that reasoning based on religious beliefs
is inherently more likely to lead to bad results
than reasoning based, for instance, on conservatism, libertarianism, feminism, or some other
secular philosophy. While we acknowledge “the
demonstrated, ubiquitous human propensity to
be mistaken and even to deceive oneself about
what God has revealed,”18 we are convinced that
humans are equally capable of using secular
reasons to delude themselves into doing terrible
things in the name of a greater good. Thus, as
“so much of the twentieth century attests, …
one need not be a religious believer to adhere to
one’s fundamental belief with closed-minded or
even fanatical tenacity.”19
The role of judges in a democracy
Would express use of religious-based reasoning by judges where the law is underdetermined
erode the role of judges in a democracy? Democratic values require that a judge be “principled,
independent and impartial”20 and have a strong
respect for the rule of law.
In the context of judging, we take “principled” to mean following and applying accepted
legal norms, and deciding on the evidence and
argument before the court, rather than deciding
on a whim or out of expediency or self-interest.
There is no reason to assume that reasons grounded in religious belief would be any less principled than reasons grounded in any other set of
comprehensive values.
Independence demands that judges not allow themselves to be pressured by outside enti-

56

ties (including government) into deciding a case
in a particular way; to allow external pressure to
affect a decision would diminish independence.
Judicial independence would certainly be compromised if a judge could be dictated to by a
religious organization or faith group. However,
allowing a judge to refer explicitly to religious
reasoning where the law is underdetermined
does not automatically compromise judicial
independence.
Impartiality requires that a judge be neutral
as between the parties; that is, she cannot be
predisposed to favour one party over the other.
Certainly, this value would be undermined if a
judge, consciously or unconsciously, favoured
litigants of a particular religion, or favoured
religious litigants generally over non-religious
litigants. Again, however, allowing for explicit
reliance on religious reasoning where the law
itself does not offer sufficient guidance does not
lead inevitably to such favouritism. There seems
no more reason to assume that judges would
allow themselves to be biased on the basis of
religion than on the basis of culture, ethnicity,
gender, or class. Therefore, the dual response to
concerns about bias should be the same for each
of these examples: a requirement that judges be
self-aware and alive to the possibilities of bias,
however unintended; and a concerted effort to
appoint a diverse judiciary.
The rule of law is shorthand for a number
of concepts limiting the arbitrary power of the
state. The most famous expression is that of
Dicey, who described the rule of law as requiring the following:
1.

the supremacy of regular law as opposed
to the influence of arbitrary power, excluding the existence of arbitrariness,
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary
authority on the part of the government;

2.

equality before the law, excluding the
idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law
which governs other citizens;

3.

the law of the constitution is not the
source but the consequences of the rights
of individuals as defined and enforced by
the courts. 21
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Judicial use of religious-based reasoning where
the law is underdetermined would not necessarily increase the arbitrary powers of the state,
reduce the obligation of public officials to obey
the law, or leave individual rights more vulnerable to state encroachment.
A more modern description of the rule of
law is as follows:
The rule of law presupposes that laws will usually be obeyed, that breaches of the law will
usually meet with enforcement, that government will be limited in its powers, and that
courts and the legal profession will be independent of government and of powerful private interests.22

Generally, none of these principles would be
diminished if a judge employed religious-based
reasoning in the context of legal underdeterminacy; in particular, such reasoning would
not make courts more susceptible to pressure
from government or private interests. One concern might be that individuals opposed to the
particular religious beliefs relied upon, or to
all religious beliefs, might then view the law as
less legitimate and so be less inclined to obey
it. While not dismissing this argument out of
hand, we would suggest that the same concern
could arise whenever citizens are unhappy with
the value system underlying a particular judicial
approach; in other words, this is not a concern
limited to religious-based judicial reasoning.
Unfairness
Leaving aside questions of constitutionality, which are discussed below, is it unfair to
litigants if a judge makes explicit reference to
religious-based reasoning, particularly if relying on a religious tradition not shared by the
litigant? Some would argue that religious-based
reasoning is unfair because it is inaccessible
to those of another religion, or of no religion.
We canvassed these arguments in our previous
article;23 briefly, we suggest that characterizing
religious reasoning as inaccessible confuses accessibility with persuasiveness. It is perfectly
possible to understand a public policy argument
derived from fundamental beliefs which we do
not share—we just may not be persuaded by it.
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Would express reliance on religious-based
reasoning where the law is underdetermined
be unfair because it would require appellants,
or future litigants in similar cases, to make
religious-based arguments even if they did not
wish to? It has been argued that “subsequent
litigants in analogous hard cases would have to
challenge both the court’s comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence and its
analysis of legal principles in order to prevail.”24
Arguably, however, by referring to his religious
beliefs a judge is simply explaining why he chose
one approach over another in a context where
the relevant constitutional principles, legislation and case law did not provide a clear guide.
Those religious beliefs do not, by virtue of having been referenced in the decision, now become part of the law. If the losing party wished
to appeal, she would argue that the lower court
decision was wrong in law, but would not need
to rebut the lower court judge’s “comprehensive
conviction about authentic human existence.”
This distinction can be seen if we turn again
to the issues litigated in the Dobson case. Let
us assume that a lower court judge had found
against Ryan Dobson because of concern for
the autonomy of pregnant women. There are
enough statements in the law regarding autonomy of the person for the judge to conclude
reasonably that this is a core principle of the
legal system; however, she would still have to
decide how to balance the mother’s autonomy
against the harm done to the child, and at the
time Dobson was decided, the law had not yet
struck that balance. In deciding that concerns
for the mother’s autonomy outweighed other
arguments, the judge might refer explicitly to
her belief that God created men and women
equal. Since individual autonomy is a core value
of Canada’s legal system, on appeal Ryan Dobson would have had to argue that women’s autonomy would not be undermined by allowing
a child in his situation to sue, or that autonomy for the pregnant woman is outweighed by
other equally core values. He would not have to
persuade the appeal court that the lower court
judge was wrong in her conviction that God
created men and women equal.
Perhaps the unfairness stems not from concerns about religious-based reasoning becoming
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part of the law, but from the fact that the law
can coerce the individual, and that a coercive
outcome is illegitimate if it is reached through
reasoning from values that the individual does
not share. Thus, it has been suggested that “it is
fundamentally unfair to coerce people, or to use
the corporate authority and power of the state,
when the grounds for doing so are not ones that
those affected could be expected to accept if
they made reasonable judgments.”25
The idea that state action should be founded
on grounds that all reasonable people would accept calls to mind Robert Audi’s stricture that,
in public debate, virtuous citizens should “seek
grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient to the purpose.”26
This requirement would suggest that public reason is, at a minimum, reasoning that is likely
to be seen as persuasive or at least reasonable
by a broad range of individuals. But is Professor
Audi’s approach helpful when applied to judges,
particularly in a situation of legal underdeterminacy? The very fact that the law is underdetermined suggests that the issue before the
courts is a difficult and complex one, involving
competing public policy arguments; certainly
this was so in the Dobson case. This complexity in itself lessens the likelihood of finding one
perspective that is widely accepted. Further,
even if wide agreement could be found on an
important social issue where the law is still unsettled, this agreement is likely to be at the level
of general principles that may not give much assistance in real-life decision making. According
to Greenawalt, certain statements such as “happiness is better than pain” seem so widely accepted that someone who rejected them “would
seem not to be of sound mind.”27 This may be
so, but, in any real-life clash of interests—which
is, after all, what court cases are about—a judge
is going to have to consider more pointed questions: In whom do we create happiness? And
how? And at what expense to others? What if
doing right entails pain? What if all the options available will cause pain or loss to some
individual or group and the difficult question
is how to allocate that pain? Once a judge is required to answer these more pointed questions,
it seems inevitable that the reasons for her decision will be persuasive to some, but completely
unpersuasive to others.
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Dobson is a good example: the reasoning
of both the majority decision and the dissent,
although secular, would be hotly contested by
some Canadians. There could be significant
dispute as to how to weigh and prioritize the
competing claims of autonomy versus allowing
those who have been harmed by negligence to
demand compensation. Thus, we would argue
that efforts to find public reasons—that is, reasons that will be widely “endorse[d] as sufficient
to the purpose”—are not likely to be successful,
once one moves beyond broad generalities.28
If that is so, then it seems that fairness, in the
context of judging, must mean something other
than a requirement that judges who are deciding novel issues of law find grounds for their decisions that will, in fact, be seen as reasonable by
everyone, including the losing party.29

Unconstitutionality
Even if our arguments about fairness are accepted, it is still necessary to explore whether
reliance by judges on religious-based reasoning
when the law is underdetermined would violate
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which states:
Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion.30

In other words, even if we cannot hold judges to
the standard suggested by Audi for virtuous citizens (by demanding that the basis for their decisions be acceptable to all rational individuals),
do constitutional difficulties arise if the coercive power of the state is grounded on reasoning
based on religious faith rather than on a secular
set of comprehensive values? Is it constitutional
for a feminist judge to draw upon his feminism
in deciding a new legal issue (even if the losing
litigant is profoundly opposed to all feminist
principles) but unconstitutional, because of the
protection given in section 2(a) of the Charter,
for a religious judge to draw upon her faith in
deciding an equally novel issue?31
Distilling the case law and academic commentary, freedom of religion in Canada includes both a positive aspect (“freedom for religion”) and a negative aspect (“freedom from
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religion”).32 The positive aspect of freedom of
religion, that is, the right to worship and live out
one’s religion as one wishes, so long as this does
not harm another’s rights, has been described
by the Supreme Court of Canada as including
“the right to entertain such religious beliefs as
a person chooses, the right to declare religious
beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and
dissemination”33 and the right not to have one’s
“profoundly personal beliefs”34 interfered with.
Would the positive aspect of section 2(a) of the
Charter—freedom for religion—be infringed if
the judges in the Dobson case reasoned from a
religious basis in deciding whether a child could
sue its mother for harm caused by the mother’s
negligence during pregnancy? Religious-based
reasoning would not have interfered with the
litigants’ “profoundly personal beliefs” or undermined their right to manifest those beliefs.
The negative aspect of section 2(a), “freedom
from religion,” protects individuals from direct
and indirect coercion.35 This aspect of freedom
of religion has been interpreted broadly, and
it requires the state to be neutral among religions and between religion and non-religion.
More specifically, it is unconstitutional for the
state to act for a religious purpose, as the Supreme Court of Canada made clear by striking
down legislation intended to enforce a Sunday
Sabbath.36
Where the law is underdetermined, if a
judge places some reliance on her religious
beliefs in choosing between available options,
does that create a form of unconstitutional coercion for the losing litigant who does not share
those religious beliefs? Or, taking this further,
does it undermine the freedom of religion of
citizens more generally—those citizens who do
not share the judge’s religious views, yet will
be affected by the development in the law? We
see this as potentially the strongest argument
against religious-based reasoning, and we take
seriously the need to ensure that judicial reasoning does not fall short of the requirement for
neutrality both among religions and between
religion and non-religion.
Returning again to Dobson, a judge could
place significant weight on the autonomy of
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pregnant women for secular reasons or for religious reasons. Similarly, a judge could place
significant weight on protecting the unborn for
secular reasons or for religious reasons. Whichever the outcome, would the judge have acted
constitutionally where secular reasoning was
used but unconstitutionally where religiousbased reasoning was used? By using his religious faith as a starting place from which to
work through the weighing of competing principles in a particular factual context, would the
judge have failed the requirement to be neutral
among religions or between religion and nonreligion? It is hard to see how the requirement
of neutrality would have been breached. The
state would not have set one religion above
another, nor would it have privileged religion
above atheism or agnosticism. Nor would the
state be acting for a religious purpose.
The issues may become somewhat more nuanced, however, if religious belief plays some
part in the dispute itself or if the case involves
issues on which at least some religions have specific teachings. Consider the case of Brockie v
Brillinger,37 which involved both these aspects.
Mr. Brockie, the owner of a printing company,
refused to print letterhead and other materials
for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives, an
organization committed to enhancing the position of gays and lesbians in society by providing “public access to information, records and
artifacts, by and about lesbians and gay men in
Canada.”3 Mr. Brillinger, the president of the
Archives, brought a complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code39 of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. At the hearing,
Mr. Brockie stated that he had no objection to
serving gay or lesbian individuals but that his
religious beliefs prevented him from printing
material for an organization that advocated for
gay and lesbian rights. The adjudicator upheld
the complaint and required Mr. Brockie to print
the material and to pay $5,000 in damages.
Assume that this decision was appealed to
the court; the judge hearing the matter would
be faced with the difficult matter of balancing
two conflicting rights-based claims: Mr. Brillinger claimed that he was being discriminated
against on the basis of sexual orientation and
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Mr. Brockie claimed that any attempt by the
state to force him to act against his religious
principles would violate his freedom of religion.
The current law in Canada provides very little
guidance as to how these kinds of competing
rights claims should be resolved. What if the
judge canvassed all relevant constitutional principles, legislation and case law, but none proved
conclusive as to which right should trump the
other? In deciding which of the rival claims to
privilege, it is quite likely that a judge would
have to turn (as presumably the adjudicator did,
although not explicitly40) to an extra-judicial
set of values. Would the constitutionality of the
judge’s reasoning depend on whether those values were religious in nature?
One could imagine a judge deciding either
way, based on secular grounds: “Creating a just
society requires that close attention be paid to
the need to uphold the dignity of all individuals,
particularly those, like gays and lesbians, who
have historically faced oppression and exclusion”; or “A liberal democratic state requires a
healthy dose of self-restraint on the part of government and courts; therefore, courts should be
very wary of forcing individuals to act against
their core beliefs.”
It is also possible to imagine a judge deciding either way using religious-based reasoning.
Here, however, it may be useful to consider different
religious-based formulations and re-emphasize the
requirement that legal reasoning of any sort involve
actual reasoning rather than simply the stating
of conclusions. In deciding for Mr. Brillinger,
a judge might start his analysis from the position that “All individuals are part of God’s creation and, therefore, in weighing these claims
before me, significant weight must be given to
safeguarding the dignity of each individual.”
Another judge might state: “God particularly
loves the dispossessed, so the claims of gays and
lesbians must always take priority over freedom
of religion claims.” In deciding for Mr. Brockie, one step in the judge’s reasoning might be
as follows: “As a believer myself, I understand
that Mr. Brockie cannot simply set aside his
religious beliefs while operating in the worka-day world. So, while giving serious weight to
the harm done to Mr. Brillinger if his business
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is refused, I will also give serious consideration
to the harm caused by forcing an individual to
act in opposition to their religious convictions.”
On the other hand, a judge might decide for Mr.
Brockie on the basis that “The Bible prohibits
homosexuality and so claims based on sexual
orientation must always be subordinated to other claims.”
Arguably, the second approach in each pair
is problematic in that it suggests the automatic
privileging of one kind of claim over another.
Such an approach fails to reflect the fact that
the law in Canada protects both sexual orientation and religious freedom, and it comes perilously close to deciding a case based on who the
parties are rather than on an analysis of the issues at stake. Rather than using one’s religious
convictions as a lens through which to evaluate
competing legal principles, a certain religious
belief is substituted for legal analysis.41 Further,
at least one of these formulations—“The Bible
prohibits homosexuality and so claims based on
sexual orientation must always be subordinated
to other claims”—conflicts with the constitutional requirement of neutrality because it favours one religious doctrine over other possible
interpretations of the Bible and over religious
teachings from other faiths. Or, to state it differently, the judge could be seen as acting for a
religious purpose; that is, deciding in a particular way so as to implement a particular religious
rule.

Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that, within certain parameters, it is acceptable for a judge in a
secular liberal democracy to include religiousbased reasoning in a judgment. Perhaps a prior question is whether it is even possible for a
religious person to set aside his or her beliefs
when making certain sorts of decisions. We
are of the view that, on issues of any significance, no one can “bracket” their most fundamental beliefs (whether those are of a religious
nature or based on a secular set of core values)
when having to choose between two or more
available outcomes.42 This would suggest that
where the law is underdetermined, religious
judges will inevitably be influenced by their
Volume 19, Number 2, 2011

religious beliefs, just as liberal judges will be
influenced by their liberalism, humanist judges influenced by their humanist philosophy,
and so on. Some authors, such as Mark Modak-Truran, acknowledge “the necessary reliance on religious convictions” where the law
is underdetermined,43 but argue that this reliance should not be made explicit. We would
argue in favour of transparency.
While religious-based reasoning is not inherently dangerous or problematic, the use of
such reasoning by judges does raise questions
about the role of judges, fairness, and constitutionality, which must be taken seriously.
We conclude that reference to comprehensive values, including religious values, would
not undermine the proper role of the judiciary,
so long as this reference is limited to situations
where the law truly is underdetermined, and so
long as there is actual reasoning, not simply a
jump from a religious premise to a conclusion.
In our view, if these conditions are met, there
is nothing in religious-based judicial reasoning
that inherently conflicts with the requirement
that judges be principled, independent and impartial and have a strong respect for the rule of
law.
So long as the same limits are observed,
such reasoning is not, in our view, unfair. We
reject the notion that there exists some form
of “public reason” that would be acceptable to
all reasonable individuals. Thus we consider it
unrealistic to suggest that fairness requires judicial decisions to be grounded in reasons that
would be considered satisfactory by all, including the losing litigants. Where the underdetermined nature of the legal issue at stake requires judges to turn to extra-judicial values as
a starting place for their analysis, it is no more
unfair to the litigant who does not share the
judge’s worldview if that analytic framework is
based on religious grounds than if it is based on
a secular philosophy such as libertarianism or
communitarianism.
We also conclude that section 2(a) of the Charter is not automatically violated by religious-based
judicial reasoning, assuming the parameters set
out above are observed: the judge may only turn
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to extra-judicial comprehensive values when
the law is underdetermined, and must engage
in actual analysis and reasoning. The losing
litigant’s rights “to manifest religious belief by
worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination,”44 and “not to be compelled to belong to a particular religion or to act in a manner contrary to one’s religious beliefs,”45 would
not be eroded simply because the judge reasoned from a faith-based worldview. Nor does
using such a worldview as the starting place for
judicial analysis necessarily depart from the requirement of state neutrality regarding religion
and thus result in unconstitutional coercion.
We do recognize, however, that certain kinds
of religious reasoning could indeed fall short of
the constitutional requirement that the state remain neutral among different religions and between religion and non-religion. If a judge used
her religious convictions to always side with religious litigants over non-religious litigants, or
to side with litigants of a particular faith, this
would violate section 2(a) of the Charter (as well
as violating more generally the judge’s duty of
impartiality, not to mention failing to live up
to the expectation that judicial reasoning involves actual reasoning). Further, a judge who
decided in a certain way so as to uphold a particular tenet of his faith would violate litigants’
freedom of religion. If judges are alert to these
potential pitfalls, however, we would argue that
there is no constitutional breach if a judge relies
on religious-based reasoning when faced with
a novel question of law to which constitutional principles, legislation and relevant case law
provide no answer. In such a situation, a judge
must inevitably turn to some set of comprehensive values as a starting place for his analysis of
competing public policy arguments and, if the
restrictions set out above are adhered to, it is
no more inherently dangerous or problematic
if those values arise from religious rather than
secular convictions.
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